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ABSTRACT—Is an armed citizenry consistent with a carceral state?
Throughout the twentieth century, the Second Amendment cast no shadow
on the U.S. Supreme Court as the Court crafted the constitutional doctrines
that license America’s expansive criminal legal system. Under the Court’s
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, the fact or mere possibility that an
individual is armed can generate broad powers for police officers, including
the power to disarm. But since the Court embraced an individual right to bear
arms in 2008, a few scholars and lower courts have begun to worry that this
right contradicts contemporary understandings of police authority. In this
Essay, I acknowledge these apparent doctrinal contradictions but argue that
Fourth and Second Amendment doctrines actually share a common
conceptual foundation: carceral political theory. Carceral political theory
divides people into “criminals” and “law-abiding citizens” and does so
according to intuitions about natural criminality rather than through positive
law. The supposed distinction between the criminal and the law-abiding is
used to rationalize unequal distributions of political power, social goods, and
exposure to violence. In the United States, the naturalized conception of
criminality has long been racialized. Unless we identify and reject the
carceral assumptions that underlie both Fourth and Second Amendment
doctrine, the new (or newly recognized) right to bear arms is likely to further
exacerbate racial inequality in the United States.
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INTRODUCTION
In the early years of the new millennium, Americans (or at least some
of them) seemed to awaken and recognize two previously overlooked legal
truths. The first realization concerned criminal law; the second, the
Constitution. Although imprisonment rates had been climbing for a few
decades before 2000 and racial disparities in criminal law enforcement had
existed for even longer, the early years of the twenty-first century saw the
first widespread recognition of racialized “mass incarceration.”1 Legal elites
and then the public more broadly identified a “crisis” in criminal justice.2
Though it was not the first time such a crisis had been identified, the scale of
the crisis and the degree of consensus about it seemed new.3
The second moment of realization came in 2008 with the Supreme
Court’s determination that the Second Amendment protects an individual
right to bear arms. Of course, there is an ongoing dispute about whether
District of Columbia v. Heller really was, as the majority opinion claimed,
simply a belated recognition of a right that had existed since the eighteenth
century or even earlier.4 The Heller dissenters, and many commentators,
argued that five Justices of the Court crafted a new right in 2008 rather than

1

See JONATHAN SIMON, MASS INCARCERATION ON TRIAL 3 (2014) (noting that incarceration rates
began to rise in the 1970s, and the increases were easily discernible by the 1980s, but it took about twentyfive more years for critiques of mass incarceration to “gain some traction politically”). For more on the
connotations of the term mass incarceration, see infra note 14 and accompanying text.
2 See Alice Ristroph, An Intellectual History of Mass Incarceration, 60 B.C. L. REV. 1949, 2000–06
(2019) (examining shifting ideas of “crisis” in criminal law in the late twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries).
3 See id. at 2004–06; see also Cecelia Klingele, The Promises and Perils of Evidence-Based
Corrections, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 537, 550 (2016) (“The turning point in the conversation about
mass incarceration came around the turn of the century . . . .”).
4 554 U.S. 570, 625–26 (2008) (claiming to adopt “the original understanding of the Second
Amendment” and claiming that “[i]t should be unsurprising that such a significant matter has been for so
long judicially unresolved”).
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recognized an old one.5 Whether or not an individual right to bear arms
existed outside of constitutional doctrine before Heller, it is clear that Heller
is the Court’s first direct affirmation of such a right.
These two realizations have prompted new questions about whether
both truths can endure. Are the expansive powers of American police forces,
which are one of several factors enabling racialized mass incarceration,
compatible with an individual right to bear arms? In Fourth Amendment
doctrine, the prospect that a person may be armed often expands police
authority to conduct searches and seizures and to use force.6 Can such
authority be sustained after Heller, or do we face, as one commentator has
put it, a possible collision “at the intersection of Second and Fourth”?7 Are
doctrinal adjustments—to police authority, gun rights, or both—necessary to
avoid the collision, as several commentators have suggested?8
This Essay acknowledges these apparent doctrinal conflicts but
suggests that they may be an illusion. There is, in fact, an underlying
conceptual consistency across the laws that enable mass incarceration and
the post-Heller constitutional law of gun rights. Both areas of law license
violence as a response to “criminals,” with a specific conception of
criminality that has less to do with one’s acts and more to do with one’s
status. In the way of thinking that I will describe as “carceral political
theory,” criminality serves as a principle of political organization, dividing
the populace into “law-abiding citizens” and “criminals.” Political goods and
power are distributed according to that organizing principle; so too is the
license to do violence and protection from it. Inequality of rights and power
is critical to the model, and thus “a carceral state” is distinct from a police
Id. at 637 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Specifically, there is no indication that the Framers of the
Amendment intended to enshrine the common-law right of self-defense in the Constitution.”); see, e.g.,
Dennis Baron, Corpus Evidence Illuminates the Meaning of Bear Arms, 46 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 509,
510 (2019) (arguing that “Justice Scalia was wrong” to conclude in Heller that the Founders intended the
Second Amendment to encompass an individual right to bear arms unconnected to militia service); Reva
B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191,
192 (2008) (“Heller’s originalism enforces understandings of the Second Amendment that were forged
in the late twentieth century . . . .”).
6 See infra Section II.A.
7 J. Richard Broughton, Danger at the Intersection of Second and Fourth, 54 IDAHO L. REV. 379,
379, 381–82 (2018).
8 See Jeffrey Bellin, The Right to Remain Armed, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 6, 34–42 (2015) (“[T]he
transforming gun-rights landscape undermines the Fourth Amendment validity of . . . gun-oriented
policing.”); Broughton, supra note 7, at 404–06 (discussing possible changes to Fourth Amendment law
in light of Heller); Shawn E. Fields, Stop and Frisk in a Concealed Carry World, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1675,
1679–81 (2018) (suggesting changes to Fourth Amendment doctrine in light of Heller). But see Nirej
Sekhon, The Second Amendment in the Street, 112 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 271, 273 (2018) (suggesting
that the apparent “doctrinal collision” is unlikely to make a significant difference to police power “on the
streets” given existing Fourth Amendment doctrine).
5
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state or a totalitarian state, each of which is usually understood to leave all
citizens equally subjugated or at least roughly equally vulnerable to
subjugation.9 In a carceral state, those classified as law-abiding citizens are
in fact less vulnerable to domination through criminal law. Indeed, those
classified as law-abiding citizens enjoy some rights of resistance or even
rights of domination: the right to deploy violence as a private citizen against
the purported criminal. Conflicts between, and different rules for, the lawabiding citizen and the criminal are part of the governance model of a
carceral state.
On this theoretical conception, the word “criminal” is not merely an
adjective that modifies laws or behavior but a noun that names a certain type
of person. As an attribute of persons rather than acts, criminality becomes
understood in terms of character, personality, genetics—and often, race.
Similarly, the term “law-abiding citizen” is used as an assessment of
character and personality rather than a straight description of one’s conduct.
Eschewing conduct identified in criminal statutes is neither necessary nor
sufficient to be a “law-abiding citizen,” and engaging in such conduct is
neither necessary nor sufficient to be a “criminal.” More important than
positive law, legal process, or factual proof are vague intuitions about what
or who is criminal by nature.
To be sure, the U.S. Constitution contains promises of equal protection,
and limitations of penal power, that seem at odds with carceral political
theory. But the Constitution as interpreted (and in some instances, even as
written) excludes criminals from its broad promises of equality.10 In criminal
procedure decisions throughout the twentieth century, the Supreme Court
often assumed that the Constitution provides different levels of protection to
criminals and law-abiding citizens.11 And when the Court took up the Second
Amendment in Heller, it made clear that the right to bear arms belonged to
law-abiding citizens but not to criminals—and indeed, the right was
necessary so that law-abiding citizens could defend themselves against
criminals.12 Amid all the attention given to the question of whether the
Second Amendment protects an individual or collective right, there has been
too little scrutiny of the Court’s choice to embrace a selective right. This
Essay seeks to illuminate the extent to which existing doctrine protects a
9 See, e.g., Thomas Crocker, Dystopian Constitutionalism, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 593, 633–34
(2015) (citing the Oxford English Dictionary in support of an account of a “police state” as a dystopian
state in which broad and discretionary police powers are used to control the population at large).
10 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (prohibiting slavery, except “as a punishment for crime”); id. amend.
XIV, § 2 (providing that a state’s denial of the right to vote would reduce the state’s representation in
Congress, unless voting rights were denied “for participation in rebellion, or other crime”).
11 See infra Section II.A.
12 See infra Section II.B.
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selective right to do violence, and it invites reflection about the possibility of
more egalitarian interpretations.
Part I introduces the political principles and ideas that I call carceral
political theory. It asks what it means to describe America as “a carceral
state,” with particular emphasis on the process by which a conception of
natural criminality supplanted slavery as the primary rationalization of
political inequality. Part II turns to Supreme Court decisions, showing that
principles of carceral political theory underlie constitutional criminal
procedure as well as Heller and its progeny. With regard to Second
Amendment doctrine, it is particularly illuminating to contrast the Court’s
theory of a selective right of self-defense to a universal and truly egalitarian
right of self-preservation. To that end, Part III looks closely at two influential
theories of an individual right to use force in self-defense, both from roughly
the same period of English history in which the Court finds the intellectual
roots of the American right to bear arms. Thomas Hobbes articulated a
universal and inalienable right of self-preservation, a right so robust that even
once a state was established, individuals would possess a right to resist
punishment. John Locke amended Hobbes’s theories to reduce or eliminate
their radical egalitarianism, in part by naturalizing both criminality and
punishment to rationalize a selective right to use violence. In Locke’s state
of nature, equality turns out to be an equal right of all “innocent” persons to
punish all “offenders.” Indeed, for Locke, self-defense comes as an
afterthought, arising only once the state of nature has devolved into a state
of war. It is of little surprise that Locke’s carceral political theory inspires
many contemporary efforts to theorize the Second Amendment. And it will
not be surprising if the right to bear arms, conceived as a selective right of
the law-abiding to do violence against criminals, proves easily reconcilable
with the expansive police authority of a carceral state.
The political theory of a carceral state has been operative in the United
States for decades, but it has not yet been recognized and scrutinized.
Theories of the Second Amendment that would make it a right to be shared
by all—a right to possess guns for hunting and recreation, for example, or to
enable universal vigilance against tyranny—are increasingly obscured by a
carceral theory that empowers some citizens to hold guns for the purpose of
doing violence to others. As the country is confronted once again with its
failures to achieve its promise of equality, attention is overdue for the
carceral principles that have been incorporated into constitutional doctrine to
legitimize inequality.
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I.

CARCERAL POLITICAL THEORY

“Carceral political theory” is not a widely used term, but the phrase
“carceral state” has proliferated in the last decade.13 By looking closely at the
usage of the latter term, we may begin to identify the principles and practices
that carceral political theory tries to explain or rationalize. Some effort at
specificity is worthwhile, as demonstrated by debates about “mass
incarceration” that sometimes feature different scholars using the same term
to mean different things: is mass incarceration a description of prison
populations specifically, or a reference to a much wider array of criminal and
even ostensibly civil interventions?14 My own interest is in the broad
expansion of America’s criminal legal system across many types of custodial
and noncustodial legal interventions. Ideas influence practices, and thus this
Part examines the ideas that seem to underlie America’s distinctively severe
and interventionist penal practices.
Again, “carceral state” is a useful point of departure. It may help to
begin by noticing articles, definite or indefinite. Many commentators attach
a definite article to the phrase: “the carceral state.” With the definite article,
“the carceral state” is often used to refer only to the sprawling entirety of
public institutions and practices related to criminal law, including prisons but
extending far beyond them.15 The carceral state encompasses all of what has

13 See, e.g., Marie Gottschalk, Bring It On: The Future of Penal Reform, the Carceral State, and
American Politics, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 559, 559 (2015) (noting that “a tenacious carceral state has
sprouted in the shadows of mass imprisonment” despite widespread “criticism of the country’s
extraordinary incarceration rate”); Naomi Murakawa, Mass Incarceration Is Dead, Long Live the
Carceral State!, 55 TULSA L. REV. 251, 251–52 (2020) (book review) (discussing differences between
mass incarceration and the carceral state).
14 Compare, e.g., John F. Pfaff, Escaping from the Standard Story: Why the Conventional Wisdom
on Prison Growth Is Wrong, and Where We Can Go from Here, 26 FED. SENT’G REP. 265, 265 (2014)
(focusing mostly on prison and sentencing statistics to argue that Michelle Alexander is “categorically
wrong” to identify drug crimes as “the primary source of prison growth”), with MICHELLE ALEXANDER,
THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 13 (2010) (explaining that
she uses “mass incarceration” to refer not simply to prison populations but all of “the criminal justice
system [and] also to the larger web of laws, rules, policies, and customs that control those labeled
criminals both in and out of prison”). For still another perspective on the term “mass incarceration,” see
Dylan Rodríguez, Abolition as Praxis of Human Being: A Foreword, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1575, 1583–84
(2019), which suggests that the term mass incarceration obscures the racialized, gendered, and colonialist
aspects of U.S. criminal law.
15 See, e.g., Katherine Beckett & Megan Ming Francis, The Origins of Mass Incarceration: The
Racial Politics of Crime and Punishment in the Post-Civil Rights Era, 16 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 433,
434–35 (2020) (distinguishing among “mass imprisonment,” referring specifically to prison populations;
“mass incarceration,” referring to prison and jail populations together; and “the carceral state,” referring
to a broader array of criminal interventions including policing practices); Murakawa, supra note 13, at
251–52 (“As the infrastructure of criminalization, the carceral state includes police, criminal courts,
probation and parole, criminal records databases and risk-assessment tools, brick-and-mortar
incarceration, and ‘e-carceration’ with electronic shackles.”).
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long been called “the criminal justice system.” Used in this way, the carceral
state can exist alongside (though it may dominate) other unwieldy collections
of government institutions and practices loosely joined by common policy
concerns, such as “the welfare state” or “the national security state.” I take
no strong position for or against the phrase “the carceral state,” though I
share some commentators’ concern that the phrase (with the definite article)
can conjure a misleading image of unity and coherence among criminal legal
institutions—notably, a concern also raised about the phrase “the criminal
justice system.”16
With an indefinite article rather than a definite one, the phrase “a
carceral state” calls to mind something slightly different. Here, the adjective
“carceral” seems to modify the entire political structure of a given nation,
not simply a subset of state institutions. I don’t want to overemphasize the
distinction; some commentators use the formulation “the ___ state” to
identify a “form of governance” if not quite a type of government.17 But I do
think there is value in asking whether a carceral state, like a police state, a
totalitarian state, or an authoritarian state, is a distinctive type of political
system.18 Like the concepts of a police state or an authoritarian state, the
concept of a carceral state is an ideal type, and there may be disagreement
whether and how much any given existing state corresponds to the ideal type.
I believe most invocations of “carceral state” use the phrase in the first
sense, with the definite article. But the second usage drew considerable

16 See Ashley Rubin & Michelle S. Phelps, Fracturing the Penal State: State Actors and the Role of
Conflict in Penal Change, 21 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 422, 428 (2017) (expressing a concern that
references to “the carceral state” or “the penal state” can “imply singularity, coherence, and statecenteredness rather than conflict and multiplicity”); see also Sara Mayeux, The Idea of “The Criminal
Justice System,” 45 AM. J. CRIM. L. 55, 60 (2018) (noting that the discourse of a “criminal justice system”
can limit the scope of critique of criminal law).
17 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV.
1, 3 (2008) (“[T]he United States began developing a new form of governance that features the collection,
collation, and analysis of information about populations both in the United States and around the world.
This new form of governance is the National Surveillance State.”). Political scientists Vesla Weaver and
Amy Lerman were early adopters of the term “the carceral state” with the specific aim of describing a
“system of governance.” See Vesla M. Weaver & Amy E. Lerman, Political Consequences of the
Carceral State, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 817, 818 (2010).
18 David Garland has raised this question and expressed doubts that “a penal state” (or a carceral
state) is a useful term to describe an entire type of government. He states: “In my use, the term ‘penal
state’ is not a critical term: It is used in a neutral, nonevaluative sense to describe the agencies and
authorities who make binding penal rules and direct their implementation. All developed nations have
‘penal states,’ whether their penal policies are lenient or draconian. And no state ‘is’ a penal state—
penality is only ever one state sector among many and, rarely, a dominant one.” David Garland, Penality
and the Penal State, 51 CRIMINOLOGY 475, 495 (2013). I think criminal law has far more political
significance than Garland suggests (and separately, I am less confident than he seems to be about the
possibility of “neutral, nonevaluative” theories of criminal legal institutions).
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attention in Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s dissent in Utah v. Strieff,19 in which
she denounced several lines of Fourth Amendment doctrine that together
subject persons to expansive surveillance and policing.20 This opinion raises,
but does not resolve, a question of equality that I see as central to the concept
of a carceral state—namely, is “carcerality” merely a matter of the scale or
scope of criminal interventions, or does the concept also emphasize an
unequal distribution of those interventions? The Strieff dissent does not
resolve that question because Justice Sotomayor both emphasized racial
disparities in enforcement and depicted a world in which all citizens were
subject to aggressive policing:
The white defendant in this case shows that anyone’s dignity can be violated in
this manner. But it is no secret that people of color are disproportionate victims
of this type of scrutiny. . . . [T]his case tells everyone, white and black, guilty
and innocent . . . that your body is subject to invasion while courts excuse the
violation of your rights. It implies that you are not a citizen of a democracy but
the subject of a carceral state, just waiting to be cataloged.21

As a rhetorical strategy to persuade Americans of all racial identities that
current Fourth Amendment doctrine is flawed, the emphasis on universal
vulnerability to police domination makes sense.22 But I suspect (and Justice
Sotomayor might agree) that the U.S. criminal legal system would not have
reached its current scale if the burdens of criminal law were in fact roughly
equally shared by all. Racial disparities in enforcement have made possible,
if not motivated, the vast expansion of scale. The conception of carcerality
that seems most useful is one that captures both the overall scale of criminal
interventions and the deeply inegalitarian distribution of those
interventions.23
19

136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070–71 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2069–70 (criticizing Fourth Amendment doctrine).
21 Id. at 2070–71 (internal citations omitted).
22 One could interpret Justice Sotomayor’s dissent as reflective of Derrick Bell’s interestconvergence thesis that “[t]he interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only
when it converges with the interests of whites.” Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and
the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980).
23 I have not yet mentioned Michel Foucault, the thinker most responsible for bringing the adjective
“carceral” to legal and political discourse. Foucault did use “carceral” to refer to a type of governance,
but he emphasized the panoptic surveillance of modern prisons and the adaptation of these surveillance
strategies to other settings, such as schools, workplaces, and urban spaces. See MICHEL FOUCAULT,
DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 293–308 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d
ed. 1995) (1977). Though Foucault recognized that carceral strategies are often deployed along racial
lines, racial inequality or other forms of inequality do not appear to be intrinsic to his conception of “the
carceral” (in contrast to, for example, his account of “biopolitics”). However, one dimension of Foucault’s
account of “the carceral” is critical to my own account: his claim that “the most important effect of the
20
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Indeed, a number of commentators have begun to use the term “carceral
state” to draw specific attention to criminal law as a regime of racial
inequality.24 This usage is more precise and more revealing than the use of
the term to refer to all of criminal law, or to emphasize merely the scale of
American criminal law. The emphasis on the unequal distribution of criminal
interventions helps explain why many Americans are unimpressed by
warnings of the rise of a police state, even warnings as eloquent and
evocative as Justice Sotomayor’s Strieff dissent. Many Americans simply
don’t believe that they will be subjected to heavy-handed policing and
punishment—and as “law-abiding citizens,” they are probably right.
A carceral state, as I use the term, is one that uses criminality to
rationalize and naturalize the unequal distribution of political power and
social goods. It “manag[es] a political community by subdividing it.”25 A
carceral state is hardly the only form of inegalitarian state, but it offers a
distinctive rationalization of inequality: it asserts that some individuals
deserve reduced political power and public goods because they are
“criminals.” It is important to notice that “criminal” becomes a noun that
names a category of person, rather than simply an adjective that modifies a
type of law or legal sanction. The classification of a person as a criminal is
a crucial exercise of political power; it allows the state to deny to that person
a vast range of goods and entitlements, nominally independent of criminal
law.26 And the status criminal is more salient, and more devastating, precisely
because not all citizens are criminals.27 In a carceral state, criminal law is
used strategically to manage social divisions or political conflicts. That
means that the content of criminal law is likely to look different in a carceral

carceral system and of its extension well beyond legal imprisonment is that it succeeds in making the
power to punish natural and legitimate, in lowering at least the threshold of tolerance to penality.” Id. at
301.
24 See, e.g., Dorothy Roberts, Foreword: Abolition Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19
(2019) (noting that prison abolitionists “trace the roots of today’s carceral state to the racial order
established by slavery”); Rodríguez, supra note 14, at 1576 (describing “the carceral state” as “a statecraft
that institutionalizes various forms of targeted human capture” and “carceral power” as “a totality of statesanctioned and extrastate relations of gendered racial-colonial dominance”).
25 Alice Ristroph, Farewell to the Felonry, 53 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 563, 568 (2018).
26 Id. at 605–06 (discussing ostensibly civil collateral consequences of a felony conviction and noting
that some of these consequences apply to nonfelony convictions as well).
27 This is part of what separates a carceral state from a police state and why the specific terms are
important. Policing is typically conceived as a generalized supervision of all persons, and a police state
is one in which all or most citizens are subject to arbitrary police intervention. Incarceration and criminal
prosecution have been comparatively more limited practices, targeted to specific individuals while others
remain “law-abiding” and unincarcerated. Cf. Wadie E. Said, Law Enforcement in the American Security
State, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 819, 851–52 (discussing the intersection of “the carceral state,” defined as “the
personnel and institutions that comprise our system of mass incarceration,” and “the police state in the
political sense of the term, where authorities can pick up and remove opponents”).
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state, for state actors will need ample discretion to decide who is “lawabiding” and who is “criminal.”
Criminal law is not the only mode of governance in a carceral state,
since the model presumes some class of citizens deemed “law-abiding,” and
the state needs to govern these citizens too. The carceral state, as a set of
public institutions and practices, may exist alongside the welfare state, the
administrative state, and so forth.28 But one distinctive feature of a carceral
state, as a type of government, is that crime structures the state’s
relationships even with those citizens classified as law-abiding. With lawabiding citizens, the state uses the fear of crime as a governance strategy,29
but it may also reassure that privileged group that it will enjoy strong
protections from the state’s penal power, such as those found in the U.S. Bill
of Rights. And of particular importance to this Essay, a carceral state may
even offer law-abiding citizens the opportunity to participate in the
subjugation of criminals. Hence Heller, as explained in more detail in the
next Part.
I have so far focused on the adjective carceral and said relatively little
about what constitutes a state. On that question, it is worth noting that Max
Weber’s famous definition of the modern state—that entity with a monopoly
of legitimate violence over a given jurisdiction30—is sometimes thought to
be inconsistent with the private right to bear arms under the Second
Amendment.31 As others have ably demonstrated, the perceived conflict
between Weber and a private right to bear arms is overstated if not imagined,
since Weber did not claim that the state must hold a monopoly on all means
of violence but instead a monopoly on legitimate violence.32 Moreover,
28 See, e.g., Kelly Lytle Hernández, Khalil Gibran Muhammad & Heather Ann Thompson,
Introduction: Constructing the Carceral State, 102 J. AM. HIST. 18, 20 (2015) (discussing “the carceral
state”); Julilly Kohler-Hausmann, Guns and Butter: The Welfare States, the Carceral State, and the
Politics of Exclusion in the Postwar United States, 102 J. AM. HIST. 87, 88–89 (2015) (suggesting that
“the carceral state” and “the welfare state” should be treated as “deeply integrated”).
29 See JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME 4–5 (2007) (arguing that crime is used
strategically by political and other authority figures to legitimize actions not necessarily motivated by the
desire to prevent crime, ultimately resulting in a form of governance that operates through fear of crime).
30 See Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 78 (H.H.
Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., 1948).
31 See, e.g., DAVID C. WILLIAMS, THE MYTHIC MEANINGS OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT 5 (2003)
(“This [Weberian] school further argues that the [Second] [A]mendment refers to a state militia, not a
private one of the sort that has appeared on the American cultural landscape.”); Sanford Levinson, The
Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 650 (1989) (noting the difference between the
Weberian definition and the Second Amendment’s link to conceptions of republican political order).
32 See, e.g., Robert J. Spitzer, Don’t Know Much About History, Politics, or Theory: A Comment,
73 FORDHAM L. REV. 721, 724–26 (2004) (arguing that Weber’s assertion that the modern state
monopolizes the legitimate use of force “does not mean that citizens are stripped of any recourse to
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Weber apparently contemplated that a monopolist could subcontract some of
the work of violence; he allowed that the state may designate as legitimate
some uses of force by private citizens.33 In this Essay, I rely on a notion of a
state as constituted by its authority to use violence and its authority to
distinguish between licit and illicit violence. But I do not think that notion is
exclusively Weberian, nor do I think it resolves questions about the scope of
an individual right to bear arms.
There are tensions between a carceral state, as I’ve just described one,
and a democracy premised upon the equality of all citizens. But a naturalized
conception of criminality helps manage these tensions. By a naturalized
conception, I mean one in which to be “criminal” is understood as a matter
of nature, necessity, natural law, or some combination thereof, rather than
state prerogative. The naturalized conception of criminality denies that
public officials choose who is a criminal; it asserts instead that public
officials and positive law merely vindicate dictates of natural law.34 In the
United States, this naturalized conception of criminality has long been
racialized.35
One more note about the concept of a carceral state. I have offered a
general model that is clearly based upon the specific history and practices of
the United States. It may be that no other country in the world fits this model.
That does not diminish the utility of the model. Perhaps the United States
invented a new form of government—not just once, with the Founding, but
also a second time, after the Civil War.36
Though I cannot trace carcerality in American history in full detail, I
am not sure that carcerality, as I have defined it, shaped the country from the
Founding. In fact, although concerns about abusive penal power may not
justifiable violence,” providing as an example that “a citizen acting for personal self-defense acts as an
individual, but is nevertheless accountable to the state’s judgment under the law”). Note also that
notwithstanding Heller’s claim that the Second Amendment codified a right of self-defense, the right to
bear arms and the right to self-defense are easily distinguishable. Persons convicted of felonies may lose
their right to bear arms, but no court has suggested that they are also categorically barred from a selfdefense claim if they use force (by other means) against an imminent threat. Thus, a Weberian could
embrace a right of self-defense even should he or she choose to reject a right to bear arms.
33 MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 156 (Talcott Parsons ed.,
A.M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans., 1947).
34 See Ristroph, supra note 25, at 566–67, 617.
35 See KHALIL GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS 1–8 (2010); Jonathan
Simon, Racing Abnormality, Normalizing Race: The Origins of America’s Peculiar Carceral State and
Its Prospects for Democratic Transformation Today, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1625, 1626 (2017) (addressing
“the racial underpinnings of the carceral state”).
36 As David Garland notes, “[S]ocieties that have imposed punishment on a massive scale have
generally been illiberal, undemocratic societies governed by absolutist or authoritarian states. . . .
America’s distinctive combination of liberal democracy and penal intensity seems anomalous and poses
an explanatory problem of some importance.” Garland, supra note 18, at 479.
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have been central to the drafters of the original Constitution (the Articles),
such concerns were paramount among many Antifederalists and other
influential critics whose skepticism helped produce the first set of
Amendments.37 The Bill of Rights reflects acute concern with the
government’s power to turn persons into criminals.38
To be sure, the United States was founded as a racially inegalitarian
state, one that embraced and protected race-based chattel slavery. And
slavery was sometimes rationalized on the grounds that enslaved persons
constituted a class of inherently dangerous people with criminal tendencies.
Still, it was slavery rather than criminal law that first served as the organizing
institution for racial inequality. Only once slavery, or at least its official
constitutional endorsement, ended did the country begin to reconstitute itself
as a carceral state. Some of this work was done in the Reconstruction
Amendments, which ended slavery and promised equality but with an
asterisk: slavery was abolished “except as a punishment for crime,” and
states would be penalized for abridging the right to vote “except for
participation in rebellion, or other crime.”39 These criminality carve-outs to
the new guarantees of equality would soon prove useful to help constitute a
carceral state.40
It did not take long for Southern states to take the next steps by
designating as “criminal” those persons formerly classified as slaves. After
the Civil War, Southern states quickly replaced the lost labor of enslaved
persons with a system of convict leasing, in which persons convicted of
crimes could be leased to private businesses and forced to work.41 To ensure
a sufficient supply of workers and to preserve antebellum racial hierarchies,
Southern states first used Black Codes, and then vaguely defined offenses
such as vagrancy, to select thousands of formerly enslaved persons for
conviction and forced labor.42 Convict leasing was a distinctively Southern
37 The Antifederalists were themselves a diverse group, and the Amendments ultimately ratified
reflected shared concerns of moderate Antifederalists and some Federalists. See Paul Finkelman, “A Well
Regulated Militia”: The Second Amendment in Historical Perspective, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 195, 214–
18 (2000).
38 See infra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.
39 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1; id. amend. XIV, § 2.
40 But see Hernandez et al., supra note 28, at 21 (arguing that “the carceral state . . . was first
consolidated during the early nineteenth century”).
41 See generally DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT
OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II 7–8 (2008) (discussing the correlation
between labor demands and arrest rates of Black people for inconsequential charges as well as the
crossover between slave-leasing practices and convict-leasing practices).
42 See id. at 53. Black Codes were laws enacted after the Civil War directed at Black Americans and
intended to restrict their freedom and preserve a system of forced labor. See Michele Goodwin, The
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practice, but a broader campaign to link all Black Americans to criminality
was a nationwide effort, one that helped Northern states and the federal
government tolerate the Southern practice.43 By the time the federal
government finally forced the end of convict leasing in the 1940s and 1950s,
the racialized conception of “the criminal” was sufficiently entrenched to
survive on its own.44
There still remained the problem of the federal Constitution, with a Bill
of Rights that seemed to include constraints that would make a carceral state
difficult if not impossible. But as the federal government insisted Southern
states end their most transparently racialized uses of criminal law, the
Supreme Court was in the early years of its efforts to determine the scope of
constitutional protections for criminal defendants. As discussed in the next
Part, interpretations of those rights have increasingly adopted a carceral
presumption of naturalized criminality, so that the Bill of Rights can provide
some protections for “law-abiding citizens” without getting in the way of
prosecution of “criminals.”
II. CARCERAL PRINCIPLES IN CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE
The Bill of Rights, the textual evidence of the country’s commitment to
individual liberty, is the pride of many Americans. Among the varied
protections in the first ten Amendments, protections for criminal defendants
take prominence—so much so that a new law student once asked me in
bewildered consternation, “Why did our Founders care so much about
criminals?” That is a very twenty-first-century question, a manifestation of
contemporary obliviousness to the fact that, under the positive law of British
authorities, the Founders were themselves “criminals.”45 The Founders knew
that criminal law was a standard tool of tyrants, but the Founders’ deep
suspicion of penal power did not survive many generations. The text of the
Bill of Rights did survive, however, and so the Supreme Court has faced the
Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery, Capitalism, and Mass Incarceration, 104 CORNELL L. REV.
899, 935–941 (2019). Evoking the prior practice of slave patrols and foreshadowing the later theory of
the Second Amendment as a means for the law-abiding to combat criminals, white persons as private
citizens were invited and expected to assist with vagrancy enforcement against Black persons. See Darrell
A.H. Miller, Racial Cartels and the Thirteenth Amendment Enforcement Power, 100 KY. L.J. 23, 34
(2011).
43 See MUHAMMAD, supra note 35, at 74–75.
44 See BLACKMON, supra note 41, at 377–82; MUHAMMAD, supra note 35, at 50–55 (describing
manipulation of crime data by white authors to cultivate a nationwide perception of Black people as
criminals).
45 Cf. John D. Bessler, The Death Penalty in Decline: From Colonial America to the Present,
50 CRIM. L. BULL. 245, 250 (2014) (discussing interest in restrictions on penal power among American
Founders and noting that the act of signing the Declaration of Independence put each signer “at risk of
execution for treason”).
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challenge of making the Bill of Rights safe for a carceral state.46 This Part
explains how the Court has met the challenge, looking first at constitutional
criminal procedure and then at Second Amendment doctrine.
A. Rights for the Innocent, but Not for “Criminals”
For just over a century after the adoption of the Bill of Rights, its
provisions relating to criminal prosecutions were rarely invoked or
adjudicated.47 The Bill of Rights was initially understood to apply only to the
federal government, and most prosecutions occurred in state courts.48 But
early in the twentieth century, Prohibition prompted unprecedented levels of
federal criminal enforcement, and soon after, the Supreme Court began to
develop the doctrines of “incorporation” that would apply the Bill of Rights
to state governments.49 Thus, over the past century, the Court has issued
hundreds of opinions that interpret and apply the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments. Given space constraints, I will not attempt to wade into the
sprawling case law in great detail. Rather, I want to highlight three related
features of these doctrines that have been documented elsewhere (including
in my own work) but which may take on new salience as we try to
comprehend the concept of a carceral state. Specifically, consider the Court’s
protection of enforcement discretion, the circumstances that make discretion
necessary, and the underlying assumption of a pre-procedural line between
the “guilty” and the “innocent.”
I will begin with discretion. As many commentators have noted, the
granting and protection of police and prosecutorial discretion has been a
major theme of constitutional criminal procedure.50 Of course, the Fourth and
46 Cf. Sara Mayeux, Youth and Punishment at the Roberts Court, 21 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 543, 551
(2018) (“[E]ach of the successive state-building projects of modern United States history—the
administrative and regulatory state, the welfare state, and the surveillance state—initially posed
challenges to constitutional culture and the rule of law, though (for better or worse) the ‘Constitution-inpractice’ ultimately found ways to accommodate each of them.”).
47 See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 290–91 (1998).
48 See id. at 291. But see Akhil Reed Amar, The Future of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 33 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1124 (1996) (noting that the Bill of Rights initially applied only to the federal
government but also tracing the Supreme Court’s initial neglect of criminal procedure rights to its lack of
appellate jurisdiction in federal criminal cases).
49 Cf. Francis A. Allen, The Morality of Means: Three Problems in Criminal Sanctions, 42 U. PITT.
L. REV. 737, 748 (1981) (“[F]or practical purposes the law of the fourth amendment begins not in 1791 . . .
but rather with the Prohibition Experiment in the 20th century.”).
50
See, e.g., Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed to: The Limits of Criminal
Justice Reform, 104 GEO. L.J. 1419, 1425–26 (2016) (noting that some violent and abusive police conduct
is specifically authorized by the Court); David Cole, Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A
Response to the New Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059, 1070–74 (1999) (“[T]he Supreme
Court has consistently watered down constitutional restrictions on police activity . . . .”); Nirej S. Sekhon,
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Fifth Amendments are written as constraints on state power, and the Supreme
Court sometimes describes itself as limiting enforcement discretion.51
Notwithstanding this rhetoric, the doctrinal protections of enforcement
discretion are so many and so wide that it is reasonable to see constitutional
criminal procedure as power-conferring law, granting police (and
prosecutors) various legal powers rather than imposing duties or constraints
upon them.52 Most of these powers are triggered by the officer’s or
prosecutor’s articulation of suspicion. Once an officer has a certain degree
of suspicion that “criminal activity may be afoot,” he has the power—but not
the duty or obligation—to detain the individual he finds suspicious.53 Once
an officer suspects that an individual may pose a threat to the officer or
others, the officer has the power—but not the duty or obligation—to frisk
the individual, take any weapon, and even to use force to subdue the threat.54
Once an officer has a slightly higher degree of suspicion (“probable cause”)
to believe the individual has actually committed a specific crime, the officer
has the power—but not the duty or obligation—to make an arrest and to use
force if necessary to do so.55 And with the same degree of suspicion, a
Redistributive Policing, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171, 1171 (2012) (“[C]ourts do virtually
nothing to constrain [police] departmental discretion.”); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship
Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 49–52 (1997) (“[C]onstitutional law
leaves intact a high level of discretion on the part of legislature, prosecutors, police officers, and defense
attorneys.”).
51 See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882 (1975) (finding that “[i]n the context
of border area stops, the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment demands something more
than the broad and unlimited discretion sought by the Government”). But see id. at 886–87 (finding that
stops near the border require only reasonable suspicion, which can be based in part on the “Mexican
ancestry” of the person stopped).
52
Law often operates by imposing constraints and threatening sanctions, but as legal theorists
emphasize, it also sometimes operates quite differently to confer powers rather than impose obligations.
Standard examples are laws that create the powers to contract, bequeath property, or marry. See H.L.A.
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 27–33 (2d ed. 1994). Much of Fourth and Fifth Amendment law is best
understood as conferring powers on police, rather than imposing constraints on them. See Alice Ristroph,
The Constitution of Police Violence, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1182, 1191 (2017) (“[Constitutional] doctrine
grants officers broad powers to stop or arrest, and . . . the power to stop [easily] becomes the power to
use force, even deadly force.”); see also Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure:
The Warren and Burger Courts’ Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 199–200 (1983) (discussing
rules of criminal procedure as allocations of power).
53 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968).
54 Id.; Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (“[T]he right to make an arrest or investigatory
stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect
it.”); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) (noting that police authority to frisk for weapons is
not contingent on whether the weapon violates state law).
55 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (“If an officer has probable cause to
believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may,
without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.”); see also Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; cf.
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prosecutor has the power—but not the duty or obligation—to bring formal
charges and pursue conviction.56 Both reasonable suspicion and probable
cause are, as interpreted by the Court, very low thresholds that are easy for
enforcement officials to satisfy.57
Next, why do police and prosecutors need so much discretion? Why
would a conception of a “reasonable” search or seizure not include uniform
enforcement of all criminal prohibitions, or at least some criteria beyond a
bare assertion of suspicion?58 From their earliest years, American police
forces have encountered law-breaking too widespread to make uniform
enforcement
practically,
or
politically,
feasible.59
Though
“overcriminalization” is often portrayed as a late-twentieth-century
phenomenon, American criminal law has always prohibited much ordinary,
commonplace conduct.60 Especially during Prohibition and the early years of
automobility, when traffic laws were newly codified and promptly
disobeyed, police encountered the specific problem of the purportedly “lawabiding citizen” who nonetheless breaks a law.61 That is the second theme of
criminal procedure of importance here, but it is not set forth in judicial
opinions as plainly as the straightforward grants of discretion discussed
above. However, historical studies of early and midcentury legal thought
reveal an ongoing concern to balance two aims: empowering the police to
investigate and apprehend “criminals,” while ensuring that police did not
interfere too much with “respectable” or “law-abiding” citizens who,
Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 760 (2005) (finding that a restraining order with mandatory
enforcement language did not create a constitutionally cognizable police duty to enforce the order and
noting that “[a] well established tradition of police discretion has long coexisted with apparently
mandatory arrest statutes”).
56 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (“In our system, so long as the prosecutor has
probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether
or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his
discretion.”).
57 See Cynthia Lee, Probable Cause with Teeth, 88 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 269, 277 (2020)
(characterizing the prevailing interpretation of probable cause as “[a]n extremely low threshold”); id. at
293 (noting that reasonable suspicion is a standard even lower than probable cause).
58 See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810–13 (1996) (considering and rejecting an
argument that police stops should not be considered “reasonable” unless the professed rationale for the
stop met an objective standard of reasonableness beyond bare suspicion that an offense has been
committed).
59 See Ristroph, supra note 2, at 1966–68 (noting that American police officers “have never been
expected to detect every violation and apprehend every violator”); Alice Ristroph, What Is Remembered,
118 MICH. L. REV. 1157, 1164–65, 1168–69 (2020) (noting that since their earliest days, American police
have encountered lawbreakers frequently and have “always had a great deal of discretion”).
60 Ristroph, supra note 2, at 1965.
61 Id. at 1961, 1969; see also LISA MCGIRR, THE WAR ON ALCOHOL: PROHIBITION AND THE RISE OF
THE AMERICAN STATE 71, 80–81, 119 (2016); SARAH A. SEO, POLICING THE OPEN ROAD: HOW CARS
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN FREEDOM 31 (2019).
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inconveniently, did seem to break the law rather frequently.62 Enforcement
discretion was the solution to this problem.
The Supreme Court may have been reluctant to grant such broad
discretion if it lacked confidence that enforcement officials would wield that
discretion wisely, in accordance with some principle. But the third feature of
constitutional doctrine to emphasize here is the Court’s assumption that there
is indeed an available principle to guide enforcement discretion: a preprocedural, or pre-enforcement, line between true criminals and the morally
innocent. By pre-procedural, I mean that the Court assumes that before any
investigative or adjudicative process begins, an individual’s status as
“criminal” is already fixed. One stark illustration of this conception can be
found in a favorite judicial critique of an exclusionary remedy for
constitutional violations. If evidence seized in violation of the Constitution
is excluded from legal proceedings, the Court worries that “[t]he criminal is
to go free because the constable has blundered.”63 But what makes us sure
that the person going free is indeed a “criminal”? Clearly, adjudication by an
appropriate factfinder (who has considered lawfully obtained evidence) is
not necessary to confirm criminality in the Court’s view. Nor is guilt or
criminality simply the trivial or “technical” fact of statutory violation, made
obvious by (possibly illegally seized) evidence, but instead the Court
assumes that the persons that constables choose to target are in fact
dangerous persons whom we should not want to set free.64 Technical
violation of a statute can’t serve as a principle to help enforcers decide which
persons, among the many who may have violated a statute, are appropriately
targeted. But a deeply felt, if ill-defined and usually racialized, conception
of the true criminal may do the work.65
62 SEO, supra note 61, at 156–200 (discussing the Supreme Court’s effort to balance the interests of
“respectable” drivers with police authority to enforce traffic laws as well as other criminal laws).
63 The Supreme Court frequently quotes this line from People v. Defore. See, e.g., Herring v. United
States, 555 U.S. 135, 148 (2009) (“[T]he criminal should not ‘go free because the constable has
blundered.’” (quoting People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926))).
64 Josh Bowers is correct to observe that, in the context of an arrest, the Court has found “any and all
considerations beyond technical guilt accuracy” to be “constitutionally meaningless.” Josh Bowers,
Probable Cause, Constitutional Reasonableness, and the Unrecognized Point of a “Pointless Indignity,”
66 STAN. L. REV. 987, 991 (2014). My suggestion is that the Court has been willing to leave arrests and
other enforcement intrusions minimally regulated by constitutional standards because it has been
confident that officials will be guided by extraconstitutional standards—a highly intuitive, natural law
sense of who is really a criminal.
65
Empirical evidence about how officials choose to exercise their enforcement discretion supports
the thesis that “black men are the prototypical criminals in the eyes of the law.” Butler, supra note 50, at
1426; see id. at 1448 tbl.1 (presenting statistical evidence that Black people are disproportionately
targeted by police for stop and frisks); see also Mark W. Bennett & Victoria C. Plaut, Looking Criminal
and the Presumption of Dangerousness: Afrocentric Facial Features, Skin Tone, and Criminal Justice,
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Throughout constitutional criminal procedure we find traces of a natural
law theory of criminality. Law enforcement officials need discretion because
the plain terms of criminal statutes cannot be trusted to sort reliably the true
criminals from respectable, law-abiding citizens. Indeed, policing has
increasingly been freed from the particulars of statutes, perhaps most
significantly by Terry v. Ohio.66 Terry authorized police to make seizures on
the basis of what’s come to be known as “reasonable suspicion,” and as
interpreted by most courts, reasonable suspicion doesn’t require a belief that
a particular statute has been violated.67 Terry launched a regime of “general
criminality,” one in which investigations and interventions could begin on
suspicion that “criminal activity may be afoot” rather than a belief that some
specified crime had been committed.68 Of course, prosecution itself still
requires a specified offense, but Terry gave officers license to rummage on
suspicion of undefined criminality, in the hopes of finding something that
could be plausibly prosecuted. In Terry itself, the basis of the eventual
prosecution was not attempted robbery or burglary, as one might have
expected given the officer’s claim that he thought the defendant was “casing
a job” in preparation for a “stick-up.”69 Rather, the actual charged offense
was carrying a concealed weapon.70 And that makes Terry interesting in
Second Amendment terms: why didn’t John Woodall Terry have a right to
bear arms?
In fact, the possibility of lawful gun possession did briefly worry the
prosecutor at Mr. Terry’s pretrial hearing, but it did not trouble the trial
judge.71 More generally, at least until 2008, the Second Amendment cast no

51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 745, 748–49 (2018) (noting racial disparities in arrest and pretrial release
decisions as well as sentencing).
66 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
67 See, e.g., United States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 357 (5th Cir. 2010) (“[P]olice do not have to observe
the equivalent of direct evidence of a particular specific crime . . . .”), opinion modified upon denial of
reh’g, 622 F.3d 383 (5th Cir.); see also United States v. Mastin, No. 2:16-cr-542, 2018 WL 1005158, at
*6–7 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 2, 2018) (declining to follow Pack but noting that many jurisdictions “have
concluded that police need not have a particularized suspicion of any specific crime” to conduct a Terry
stop, and citing cases); id. at *6 (noting that the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the question).
68 See, e.g., United States v. Bonilla, 357 F. App’x 693, 703 (6th Cir. 2009) (“It is well-settled that
reasonable suspicion that ‘criminal activity may be afoot’ does not require suspicion of a specific crime,
but rather criminal activity in general.” (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30)).
69 Terry, 392 U.S. at 6.
70 Id. at 7.
71 See John Q. Barrett, Appendix B: State of Ohio v. Richard D. Chilton and State of Ohio v. John
W. Terry: The Suppression Hearing and Trial Transcripts, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1387, 1414–17 (1998).
The prosecutor wanted to ask the police officer whether he had inquired of Terry’s employment
circumstances at the time of arrest, noting that the Ohio statute permitted the carrying of a concealed
weapon when engaged in a “legitimate business or occupation with large sums of money.” Id. at 1414.
The trial judge apparently viewed this question as irrelevant. Id. at 1417.
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shadow on Fourth Amendment doctrine, under which the mere suspicion that
an individual is armed triggers expansive police powers.72 Just a few years
after Terry, another stop-and-frisk case produced what is apparently the only
pre-Heller opinion to contemplate the possibility that a constitutional right
to bear arms might limit the “reasonableness” of a search or seizure. Adams
v. Williams involved a stop based on an informant’s tip that a person in a
nearby car was carrying a gun and narcotics.73 The officer approached Robert
Williams and asked him to open his car door; when Williams rolled down
the window instead, the officer reached inside and removed a gun from
Williams’s waistband.74 The applicable state law allowed individuals to carry
concealed weapons with the right permit, but the officer made no effort to
find out whether Williams had a permit before placing him under arrest for
weapons possession.75 The majority found no constitutional violation,
characterizing the removal of the gun as a frisk that was permitted “whether
or not carrying a concealed weapon violated any applicable state law.”76 The
Court found the subsequent arrest to be based on adequate probable cause,
which “does not require the same type of specific evidence of each element
of the offense as would be needed to support a conviction.”77
For purposes of this Essay, Adams is significant for Justice William O.
Douglas’s dissent, which noted that an individual-right conception of the
Second Amendment—which neither Justice Douglas nor the Court had
endorsed, but which was urged by “a powerful lobby”—would clash with
the Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.78 Justice Douglas’s
dissent is noteworthy as an anomaly, apparently the only pre-Heller opinion
from the high Court that contemplates a clash between the Second
Amendment and the powers granted to police under Fourth Amendment
doctrine. Otherwise, Fourth Amendment doctrine and constitutional criminal
procedure more broadly have reconciled defendants’ rights with a carceral
state, giving nominal recognition to constitutional protections but
interpreting those protections to grant broad enforcement discretion. And

72 “[T]he underpinning of the Court’s entire Fourth Amendment jurisprudence . . . [is] that the safety
of law enforcement officials justifies restrictions on liberty.” Darrell A.H. Miller, Retail Rebellion and
the Second Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 939, 966 (2011). Fourth Amendment doctrine grants police much
broader authority in public spaces than in private homes. If the Court decides that the Second Amendment
protects a right to bear arms in public, much of this Fourth Amendment law will come into question. See
infra note 81.
73
407 U.S. 143, 144–45 (1972).
74 Id. at 145.
75 Id. at 158–60 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
76 Id. at 146 (majority opinion).
77 Id. at 149.
78 Id. at 149–51 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

221

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

underlying the doctrine, I have argued, is a conception of naturalized
criminality and confidence that enforcement officials will use discretion to
target the true criminals.
Heller did raise some doctrinal puzzles that hadn’t previously troubled
the Court. Since 2008, numerous defendants have raised Second Amendment
challenges to stops, frisks, and other police conduct that is doctrinally
authorized when an officer suspects gun possession.79 There is presently a
circuit split concerning Terry’s requirement that a frisk be based on
reasonable suspicion that an individual is “armed and dangerous.” Is “armed
and dangerous” one single concept, with the premise that any armed
individual is therefore dangerous, or must the officer conducting a frisk have
independent suspicion of dangerousness, based on something other than the
presence of a weapon?80 The new salience of these and other doctrinal
questions has led some commentators to suggest that Second Amendment
law may place new constraints on the police authorities granted in Fourth
Amendment doctrine.81
My aim here is not to look closely at the details of any potential
doctrinal conflict nor to propose specific resolutions of them.82 Rather, I want
to emphasize continuity, not conflict. Like constitutional criminal procedure,
the new Second Amendment law launched by Heller is motivated by a lawand-order vision that seeks the suppression of “criminals.”
B. Arms for the Law-Abiding, to Be Used Against “Criminals”
America’s turn toward a carceral state began at least by the late
nineteenth century,83 and the principles of carceral political theory ran deep
79

See Bellin, supra note 8, at 28–29; Fields, supra note 8, at 1696–98.
Compare United States v. Robinson, 846 F.3d 694, 698, 701 (4th Cir. 2017) (finding possession
of a firearm to be itself sufficient to establish the requisite suspicion of dangerousness for a Terry frisk),
with Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dep’t, 785 F.3d 1128, 1132 (6th Cir. 2015) (noting that evidence
that a person is (legally) armed is not itself sufficient to warrant suspicion that the same person is
dangerous). For a more comprehensive overview of the case law on this issue as of 2019, see Alexander
Butwin, Note, “Armed and Dangerous” a Half Century Later: Today’s Gun Rights Should Impact Terry’s
Framework, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1033, 1047–53 (2019).
81 E.g., Bellin, supra note 8, at 43 (“[W]e may be witnessing the beginning of the end of a form of
proactive gun policing long viewed by city residents and their police chiefs as essential to public safety.”).
So far, the Supreme Court has not decided whether the Second Amendment protects a right to “public
carry,” or bearing arms in public spaces rather than private homes. But the Court has recently agreed to
hear a case that raises this question. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, No. 20-843 (U.S. Apr.
26, 2021), https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/20843.html [https://perma.cc/V2JA-ME2E]. A right to public carry could conflict with Terry doctrine, but
the significance of any conflict depends in part on who holds the right to bear arms in public.
82 For proposed doctrinal adjustments related to Terry frisks, see Broughton, supra note 7, at 397–
405, and Fields, supra note 8, at 1687–94.
83 See BLACKMON, supra note 41, at 53.
80
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in constitutional doctrine by the time the Court recognized an individual right
to bear arms in Heller. It is not surprising that the specter of criminality
would structure the decision, which recognizes an individual right of “lawabiding, responsible citizens” to bear arms for self-defense.84 But it is only
the specter of criminality: though the Heller Court mentioned “self-defense”
at least eighty-three times, it usually did so without specifying the threat
against whom the defender would use arms.85 Many, but not all, of the
references to self-defense referred specifically to the home.86 One brief
passage refers to “an attacker” and “a burglar,” and shortly thereafter there
is a reference to “intruders.”87 Otherwise, though, self-defense is taken as
self-explanatory, as though the threats that create the occasions for selfdefense are obvious to all. Heller was soon followed by McDonald v. City of
Chicago, where the litigants and the Court were more direct about the threats
that occasioned self-defense: “The Chicago petitioners and their amici . . .
argue that the handgun ban has left them vulnerable to criminals.”88 Second
Amendment doctrine has been launched with a carceral logic: the right to
bear arms is not simply a right that belongs to some members of the political
community but not others. It is a right that some individuals possess for the
purpose of doing violence to other members of the community—those
labeled “criminals.”89

84 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). Dick Heller, the petitioner, was a police
officer who wished to keep a handgun at home. Id. at 575.
85 See Eric Ruben, An Unstable Core: Self-Defense and the Second Amendment, 108 CALIF. L. REV.
63, 64 (2020) (noting that the Heller Court referenced self-defense eighty-three times); Darrell A.H.
Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1294
(2009) (noting that Heller protects a right of self-defense but “does not specify against whom, when, or
where”).
86 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (“[The Second Amendment] surely elevates above all other interests
the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”).
87 Id. at 629–30.
88 561 U.S. 742, 751 (2010).
89 Different rationales for a right to bear arms imagine different targets of the weapons: if individuals
bear arms to hunt or for recreation, nonhuman animals or inanimate objects are the targets; if we bear
arms to protect against tyranny, would-be tyrants are the targets; if we bear arms for self-defense,
threatening “criminals” are the targets. Heller relies primarily on the last rationale, thus imagining
violence as constitutive of a political community and assuming that some community members will be
the legitimate targets of others. Relatedly, David Williams has noted that even “outgroup theories” of the
Second Amendment, or vigorous calls for gun rights from historically disempowered groups, “argue that
the Constitution itself assumes that the world will always be filled with hatred.” David C. Williams,
Constitutional Tales of Violence: Populists, Outgroups, and the Multicultural Landscape of the Second
Amendment, 74 TUL. L. REV. 387, 392 (1999); see also Kate Masters, Fear of Other People Is Now the
Primary Motivation for American Gun Ownership, A Landmark Survey Finds, TRACE (Sept. 19, 2016),
https://www.thetrace.org/2016/09/harvard-gun-ownership-study-self-defense/ [https://perma.cc/Y8FYYHW4] (noting that gun owners increasingly cite self-defense as the reason to own firearms, whereas
two decades ago recreation and hunting were more frequently cited reasons).
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Born as it was in an already-carceral regime, Heller’s carceral logic has
not drawn much commentary. In the remainder of this Essay, I note three
blind spots in Second Amendment doctrine and commentary. First, the case
law and commentary has given relatively little attention to criminal law and
its doctrines of self-defense. Second, the intense debate over whether the
right to bear arms is an individual right or collective right has eclipsed
another dichotomy that is equally or more important: is the underlying right
of self-defense a universal and inalienable one enjoyed by all individuals, or
a selective (and possibly defeasible) one? Third, what would be the political
implications of an individual right of self-defense that is equally enjoyed by
all members of a political community? I take up the first two issues in the
remainder of this Section and the third in Part III below.
Though much Second Amendment commentary notes the contrast
between “law-abiding citizens” and “criminals” (placing quotation marks
around the terms), there have been few efforts to scrutinize the theory of
criminality that underlies this contrast.90 Unlike felon or misdemeanant or
arrestee or burglar, the noun “criminal,” as a category of person, has no
precise legal meaning. Criminals could conceivably include all persons who
have engaged in conduct that violates a criminal statute, whether they are
ever charged or convicted. This definition likely would include most
Americans and probably isn’t what Justice Samuel Alito had in mind in his
McDonald majority opinion. Instead, the right to bear arms is necessary for
encounters with sufficiently violent and dangerous persons—but use a gun
against a threat later determined not sufficiently dangerous, and you may be
the criminal.91 In court, self-defense claims often fail, for criminal statutes
and judicial interpretations offer an affirmative defense only in narrow

90 Jacob Charles and Brandon Garrett note that federal gun enforcement strategies seek to protect gun
rights for the “law-abiding” while imposing severe penalties on “thugs” and “gangsters” who possess
guns. Jacob D. Charles & Brandon L. Garrett, The Trajectory of Federal Gun Crimes, U. PA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 46–50), https://papers.ssrn.com/a=3685910 [https://perma.cc/3AA63LLG]. For a pre-Heller critique of the phrases “law-abiding citizen” and “criminal,” see Steven R.
Morrison, Will to Power, Will to Reality, and Racial Profiling: How the White Male Dominant Power
Structure Creates Itself as Law Abiding Citizen Through the Creation of Black as Criminal, 2 NW. J.L.
& SOC. POL’Y 63, 80–85 (2007).
91 That is, many persons who display or actually fire weapons in purported self-defense then become
criminal suspects and criminal defendants. Whether they ever become convicted persons depends on the
legal evaluation of their self-defense claim. Cf. Joseph Blocher, Samuel W. Buell, Jacob D. Charles &
Darrell A.H. Miller, Pointing Guns, 99 TEX. L. REV. 101, 101–03 (2020) (providing examples of criminal
charges for brandishing or otherwise displaying weapons but noting that the law “falls woefully short of
effectively regulating gun displays”); Ruben, supra note 85, at 82–88 (describing basic requirements of
self-defense doctrine).
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circumstances.92 Happily, some recent scholarship has scrutinized criminal
doctrines of self-defense in relation to the Second Amendment.93 But more
generally, I think much of the American populace, even or especially the
legal profession, subscribes to a simplistic and false view of criminality (and
the threats sufficient to license violence in self-defense) as intuitive and selfevident.94 This is the naturalized view of criminality discussed above, and it
helps Second Amendment doctrine conjure images of violent criminals
without paying much heed to actual criminal doctrines or practices.95
Second Amendment case law and commentary have given more
attention to the question of criminality in one specific context: constitutional
challenges to bans on weapon possession for certain classes of convicted
persons.96 Heller specifically made room for “longstanding prohibitions on
the possession of firearms by felons” but did not say why felons should be
excluded.97 (Again, for natural law theorists, the answer may seem obvious—
but for those aware of positive American law, the range of crimes classified
as felonies and the enormous prosecutorial discretion to choose between
felony and misdemeanor charges may suggest that the Court needs to explain
why felons are so easily excluded from this right.)98
92 Typically, a self-defense claim requires showings of imminence, necessity, and proportionality.
See Ruben, supra note 85, at 82–88; State v. Steinle, 2012-53, p. 7 (La. App. 3 Cir. 10/3/12); 98 So. 3d
973, 979 (upholding denial of self-defense claim on grounds that use of deadly force was
disproportionate); People v. Lopez, 199 Cal. App. 4th 1297, 1305–06 (2011) (upholding murder
conviction after denial of self-defense claim and finding no error in jury instruction that fear of future
harm did not satisfy imminence requirement).
93 See Ruben, supra note 85, at 64–68; Darrell A.H. Miller, Self-Defense, Defense of Others, and the
State, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 85, 96–97 (2017).
94 See Alice Ristroph, The Curriculum of the Carceral State, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1631, 1689 (2020).
95 See supra notes 61–66 and accompanying text.
96 See, e.g., Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 447–48 (7th Cir. 2019) (rejecting argument that an
individual convicted of a nonviolent felony (mail fraud) retains a Second Amendment right to bear arms).
Voisine v. United States considered whether a state assault conviction counted as “a misdemeanor crime
of domestic violence” for purposes of a federal weapons ban. 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2276 (2016) (quoting
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)). Though the Court approached the question as a matter of statutory interpretation
and did not address constitutional issues, Justice Clarence Thomas raised concerns in dissent that the
majority’s approach “relegate[ed] the Second Amendment to a second-class right.” Id. at 2292 (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (quoting Friedman v. Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447, 450 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting
from the denial of certiorari)); see also Jacob D. Charles, Defeasible Second Amendment Rights:
Conceptualizing Gun Laws that Dispossess Prohibited Persons, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 62–69
(2020) (developing analytical framework to assess scope and defeasibility of Second Amendment rights).
97 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008); see also id. at 721 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(“I am similarly puzzled by the majority’s list . . . that in its view would survive Second Amendment
scrutiny,” including “prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons.” (quoting id. at 626–27
(majority opinion))).
98 See Ristroph, supra note 25, at 591–92. Before her appointment to the Supreme Court, Justice
Amy Coney Barrett, the newest member of the Supreme Court, expressed doubt about whether all felons
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The question of which offenses are a legitimate basis for denial of gun
rights is part of a larger inquiry into who constitutes “the people” who enjoy
Second Amendment rights.99 That debate preceded Heller and continues after
it, with many commentators noting various groups that have historically been
excluded from gun ownership and some urging a more universal application
of Second Amendment rights, even to noncitizens.100 In these discussions of
who enjoys the right, however, there has been insufficient attention to the
ways that the right itself might change if it is universally rather than
selectively held. In other words, the “right to bear arms” held by a subsection
of a society may simply not be the same “right to bear arms” held by all
members of society.
To explain why, a few words about English history and English political
theory are in order. The history is important because England never
embraced a universal right to bear arms, and actual English practice could
model for the Founders only a selective right. The political theory is
important because one English thinker—Thomas Hobbes—did take
seriously a universal right to self-preservation, with results that were too
radically egalitarian for his time, and so far, also for ours.
First, the history. Academic commentary—again, both before and after
Heller—often invokes the right to bear arms in English law as inspiration for
the drafters of the Second Amendment.101 For purposes of this Essay, I want

are excluded from Second Amendment protections. See Kanter, 919 F.3d at 464–65 (Barrett, J.,
dissenting) (“History does not support the proposition that felons lose their Second Amendment rights
solely because of their status as felons.”).
99 The Second Amendment protects “the right of the people to keep and bear arms.” U.S. CONST.
amend. II. As Justice Stevens noted in dissent, the Heller majority gave the phrase “the people” in the
Second Amendment an interpretation much narrower than the same phrase is given in First and Fourth
Amendment doctrines. See Heller, 544 U.S. at 644 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
100 See, e.g., Pratheepan Gulasekaram, “The People” of the Second Amendment: Citizenship and the
Right to Bear Arms, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1521, 1524 (2010) (arguing that “the Second Amendment’s text
provides no basis for limiting arms bearing to citizens”); Williams, supra note 89, at 412–13 (discussing
the claims of “outgroups” to Second Amendment rights).
101 See, e.g., JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLOAMERICAN RIGHT, at ix (1994) (asserting that the right to bear arms was “born in 1689” when included
in the English Bill of Rights “and perpetuated, with modifications, in the American Bill of Rights a
century later”); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV.
461, 475 (1995) (characterizing Malcolm’s work as representative of “[t]he mainstream scholarly
interpretation” or “the Standard Model” of the Second Amendment); David B. Kopel & Joseph G.S.
Greenlee, The “Sensitive Places” Doctrine: Locational Limits on the Right to Bear Arms,
13 CHARLESTON L. REV. 205, 210 (2018) (characterizing “English arms culture of the middle ages” as
an “ancestor” of the American right to bear arms, though insisting that early Americans sought to broaden
the right to bear arms beyond the English precedent); Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Glorious Revolution to
American Revolution: The English Origin of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
397, 400–01 (2019) (“[T]he English historical experience really does matter because the newly
independent Americans understood their rights against the backdrop of the English legal tradition.”).
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to avoid debates about which historical sources are most important or
reliable. Instead, I simply accept as true the influential work of Professor
Joyce Lee Malcolm, who is celebrated by champions of an individual right
to bear arms as the scholar who brought historical legitimacy to that
interpretation of the Second Amendment, and who is cited several times in
the Heller majority opinion.102 Malcolm’s book To Keep and Bear Arms
argues that the right to bear arms⎯“under vigorous assault in the United
States” at the time of publication in 1994⎯was a right of individuals by the
late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in England.103 “It was this heritage
that Englishmen took with them to the American colonies and this heritage
which Americans fought to protect in 1775.”104
The English right began as an instrument of state violence, on
Malcolm’s telling—though she does not use quite that language. Instead, she
emphasizes that the right to bear arms began as a duty to bear arms: a duty
to help the King keep the peace and subdue his enemies. In feudal England,
it was initially “freemen [and] the richer villeins” who “were ordered to be
armed” for service in the King’s militia, and eventually “unfree peasants
were included as well.”105 This duty included the duty to supply one’s own
weapons, which caused considerable resentment.106 The duty to bear arms
extended quite broadly to “[a]ll able-bodied men between the ages of sixteen
and sixty,” but certain groups were excluded: clergy and Catholics were
expected to help pay for the militia but not to participate in it, and Catholics
were not allowed to keep weapons at home.107
Malcolm emphasizes repeatedly that before the seventeenth century,
bearing arms was a duty and not a right. As such, the King could restrict
weapons possession as he pleased, and he sometimes did so based on the
type of person or the type of weapon—again, before the seventeenth century,
Catholics were typically selected for disarmament.108 “Although the general
public was free to have arms, because there was no right to have weapons
the government always had the power to disarm any individual or class of
102 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 592–93. For a discussion of Malcolm’s influence, see William Glaberson,
Dueling Scholars Join Fray Over a Constitutional Challenge to Gun Control Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
21, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/21/us/dueling-scholars-join-fray-over-a-constitutionalchallenge-to-gun-control-laws.html [https://perma.cc/EQG7-HPYV]. For a summary of critiques of
Malcolm’s work, see Patrick J. Charles, The Second Amendment in Historiographical Crisis: Why the
Supreme Court Must Reevaluate the Embarrassing “Standard Model” Moving Forward, 39 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1727, 1795–99 (2012).
103
MALCOLM, supra note 101, at ix.
104 Id. at 134.
105 See id. at 3–4.
106 Id. at 3–5.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 9–11.
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individuals it considered dangerous to the peace of the realm.”109 But
selective disarmament was used to protect more than peace or religious
hierarchy: it was a strategy to protect property and class interests as well,
especially the interests of the aristocracy in hunting for sport and protecting
their game from poorer persons seeking actual nourishment.110 And when
Catholic monarchs held power in the seventeenth century, they reversed
earlier religious exclusions and took care to disarm their Protestant
enemies.111
In 1688, the Glorious Revolution ended the reign of the Catholic James
II and installed William of Orange and his wife Mary (James II’s daughter,
and a Protestant) as rulers.112 Relatively quickly, William and Mary
summoned a “Convention” of elected representatives (because William and
Mary were not yet King and Queen, and only a King could summon a true
“parliament”).113 This Convention drafted and presented to William and
Mary a Declaration of Rights identifying thirteen “true, ancient, and
indubitable” rights of Englishmen, including a provision “[t]hat the Subjects,
which are Protestants, may provide and keep Arms, for their common
Defence.”114 As Malcolm puts it, “While the right of subjects to have arms
had been singled out as one of the ‘true, ancient, and indubitable’ rights to
be included in the Declaration of Rights, it was neither true, ancient, nor
indubitable. The Convention members themselves were its authors.”115 After
endorsing the Declaration of Rights and becoming King, William (and
Parliament) began to disarm Catholics to reduce any risk of a Catholic
counterrevolution.116 Thus, in England, the right to bear arms was clearly
man-made, born after decades of civil war and in anticipation of potential
further conflict. And in England, if Malcolm’s history is accurate, the right
to bear arms was always a selective right, a right of some Englishmen to
disarm and dominate others.
The drafters of the Second Amendment knew the English history but
were not bound by it. They could, in theory, have established a new and
distinctively American right to bear arms, one designed to give all citizens
equal protection against government tyranny rather than one designed to
allow some citizens to dominate others. I take no position here on what the
109

Id. at 11.
See id. at 11–15.
111 See id. at 31–53, 103–06; see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592–93 (2008)
(citing these passages for the same proposition).
112 MALCOLM, supra note 101, at 111–13.
113 Id. at 114.
114 Id. at 115, 118.
115 Id. at 115.
116 Id. at 122–23.
110
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actual drafters of the Second Amendment intended, though the next Part of
this Essay explores what a universally held right to bear arms might entail.
But whatever the Framers intended, when the Supreme Court interpreted the
Second Amendment more than two centuries after its adoption, the Court
ultimately followed English precedent, at least insofar as the Court declined
to embrace a right to bear arms enjoyed equally by all. Like the English right,
Heller’s right to bear arms would be selective, a right of some individuals to
bear arms for the purposes of overwhelming other members of the
community perceived to be dangerous. But unlike the English right, Heller’s
principle of selection is not religion or class, nor indeed would modern
constitutional doctrine allow any openly racial criteria to determine who
would have the privilege of using force against whom.117 Instead, criminality
(natural, intrinsic criminality) could serve as the selection principle. The
Court explicitly endorsed the exclusion of felons and implicitly endorsed the
exclusion of any citizen not sufficiently “responsible” or “law-abiding.”118
Thus, the Second Amendment arrived in a carceral state and immediately
accommodated itself.
I have been speaking of the right to bear arms, for that is what the text
of the Second Amendment and the Court’s recent decisions most explicitly
protect. But Heller and many commentators view the right to bear arms as a
necessary implication of a different, broader right: a right to self-defense or
self-preservation.119 Perhaps Heller’s embrace of a selective right to bear
117

The limitation of the English right to bear arms to Protestants is mentioned in Heller but is not
treated as consequential; the Court found Malcolm’s emphasis on the individual character of the right
more notable than the religious restriction. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 593 (2008)
(“To be sure, it was an individual right not available to the whole population, given that it was restricted
to Protestants . . . . But it was secured to them as individuals . . . .”).
118 See id. at 626 (“[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons . . . .”); id. at 635 (“[W]hatever else [the Second
Amendment] leaves to future evaluation, it surely elevates above all other interests the right of lawabiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”).
119 See, e.g., id. at 635 (holding that the District of Columbia’s ban on the possession of handguns in
the home for purposes of self-defense violates the Second Amendment); David B. Kopel, The Natural
Right of Self-Defense: Heller’s Lesson for the World, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 235, 237 (2008) (arguing
that Heller vindicates a preexisting natural right to self-preservation or self-defense). Though Second
Amendment doctrine and discourse treat self-defense and self-preservation as interchangeable, the two
concepts are distinguishable from one another, and both are distinct from a right to bear arms. Selfdefense is usually understood as actions against a specific threat, while self-preservation may entail
preemptive protective actions even before a threat is manifest, or the infliction of harm on someone who
does not pose a threat. If three sailors adrift on a lifeboat kill and eat an ailing and immobilized
companion, the act is plausibly one of self-preservation but not one of self-defense. See Kimberly Kessler
Ferzan, Defending Imminence, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 213, 247–48 (2004) (distinguishing self-preservation
from self-defense using the infamous facts of Regina v. Dudley and Stephens). Bearing arms can be a
particular method of self-defense or self-preservation, but it does not precisely overlap with either
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arms rests upon an underlying theory in which some persons, but not all,
have a right of self-defense. My final Part explores two theories of selfdefense—one universal, one selective—from English philosophers who
lived and wrote in the decades when Englishmen transformed the bearing of
arms from a duty into a right.
III. WHICH LIVES MATTER? TWO THEORIES OF SELF-DEFENSE
Between Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) and John Locke (1632–1704),
there’s little question who wears the laurels as the philosopher behind
American constitutionalism. Among modern commentators, including
Supreme Court Justices, Locke is seen as a champion of individual rights and
limited government and, as such, is celebrated and cited frequently.120
Hobbes is occasionally grudgingly acknowledged as the thinker who
pioneered the idea that government legitimacy depends on the consent of the
governed, but he is typically viewed as having betrayed any individualist or
liberal principles by ultimately advocating a Leviathan—an undivided and
seemingly absolute sovereign.121 A few scholars have argued that Hobbes
influenced the Founders much more than usually acknowledged, but I will

concept: there are ways of defending oneself without weapons, and there are ways of using weapons that
are not defensive.
120 Locke is invoked often both by those who endorse a strong individual right to bear arms and those
who would restrict gun ownership. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 892 (2010)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Locke for the proposition that individuals in society must give up many
rights that they may have held in the state of nature); Nicholas J. Johnson, Beyond the Second Amendment:
An Individual Right to Arms Viewed Through the Ninth Amendment, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 15–16 (1992)
(noting influence of Locke on both Second and Ninth Amendment scholarship); see also Michael Steven
Green, Why Protect Private Arms Possession? Nine Theories of the Second Amendment, 84 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 131, 154–58 (2008) (outlining an argument for an individual right to bear arms based on
principles of “Lockean . . . autonomy”).
121 Hobbes was an advisor to Charles II and an apparent enthusiast about the English monarchy.
Perhaps for that reason, many contemporary commentators assume that Hobbes’s sovereign is to be an
absolute monarch, though in fact Hobbes contemplated that sovereignty could reside in many different
sorts of institutions, including an elected assembly. See Richard Tuck, Introduction to THOMAS HOBBES,
LEVIATHAN, at ix–x, xxxvii (Richard Tuck ed., 1991) (1651). Hobbes specialists note frequently the
difference between Hobbes’s actual arguments and “Hobbism,” or the caricature of his work that pervades
popular understandings. See Sterling P. Lamprecht, Hobbes and Hobbism, 34 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 31, 34–
37 (1940). In numerous works, I have tried—without apparent success—to draw American legal scholars’
attention to the radical egalitarianism in Hobbes’s vision of individual rights. See generally Alice
Ristroph, Sovereignty and Subversion, 101 VA. L. REV. 1029, 1030 (2015) (arguing that Hobbes is often
mischaracterized or misread); Alice Ristroph, Respect and Resistance in Punishment Theory, 97 CALIF.
L. REV. 601, 615 (2009) [hereinafter Ristroph, Respect and Resistance] (“Hobbes’s radical egalitarianism
committed him to the claim that in the absence of a reciprocally recognized third party to adjudicate
disputes, each individual has an equal claim to preserve himself by whatever means he believes is
necessary.”).
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not try to resolve that question here.122 My focus in this Essay is the Second
Amendment as understood by the Supreme Court today, and my inquiry in
this Part is into conceptions of self-defense that could conceivably have
informed Heller’s right to bear arms. I will suggest that it is no surprise that
Locke’s theories have been more influential, but we have not yet appreciated
why Locke rather than Hobbes would be so attractive to the Founders as
architects of an inegalitarian state, or a carceral one. Hobbes, the supposed
absolutist, actually envisioned a universal right of self-preservation and a
right to resist punishment; Locke, the supposed liberal egalitarian, articulated
a selective right to self-defense and a natural right to punish.
Hobbes began his political theory by imagining humans without a
polity—humans in a state of nature without an established political
authority.123 In such a condition, two features of human existence are of great
significance: humans’ equal physical vulnerability and the universal desire
for self-preservation.124 Hobbes emphasized that, though humans vary in
intelligence and strength, no one is so smart or so strong that he can repel
every assault or avoid eventual death. Each person, aware of his own
vulnerability, will seek self-preservation: he will act to secure himself
against danger as best he can. Notably, Hobbes’s account of the state of
nature is not simply a set of empirical claims but a normative argument:
Hobbes claimed that each individual has not simply the desire but a natural
right to self-preservation.125 From this account, Hobbes derived two
principles so radical for his era that he had to flee England for a time and yet
so influential that today’s liberals take them for granted. Hobbes argued that
given humans’ equal vulnerability and equal right to self-preservation, no
one has a natural right to rule over others, and any legitimate government
must be based on the consent of the governed.126
But Hobbes then went on to imagine the particular structure of
government to which individuals should (and would, he claimed) give their
consent. He argued that divided governments with meaningful limits on
sovereign power would be unstable and that humans entering a social
contract should establish a sovereign with absolute power.127 Or more
precisely, almost absolute power. The natural right of self-preservation was

122

See JAMES R. STONER, JR., COMMON LAW AND LIBERAL THEORY: COKE, HOBBES, AND THE
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 71–72 (1992); Gary L. McDowell, Private Conscience &
Public Order: Hobbes & The Federalist, 25 POLITY 421, 423 (1993).
123 HOBBES, supra note 121, at 86–90.
124 Id. at 87–89.
125 Id. at 91.
126 See id. at 117–19.
127 See id. at 120.
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inalienable on Hobbes’s account.128 It was not incompatible with political
authority, even in the form of a very powerful sovereign; in most instances,
submitting to authority was the best means of self-preservation. But in the
event that a sovereign sought to destroy a subject rather than preserve him,
Hobbes made clear that the subject’s natural right to self-preservation gave
him a right to resist the sovereign. This right to resist extended to all cases
of punishment, including “Wounds, and Chayns, and Imprisonment,” not
simply capital punishment.129 Hobbes reasoned that one who allowed himself
to be physically restrained would put himself at the mercy of his captor,
which was inconsistent with the natural right of self-preservation.130 To be
clear, Hobbes also recognized that sovereignty included a right to impose
punishment, but subjects bore no duty to submit even to rightful
punishment.131 For Hobbes’s contemporaries, these ideas were strange and
radical. Leviathan was denounced as a “Rebells catechism,” and Hobbes
himself as “the Monster of Malmesbury.”132
Contrast this account of self-preservation with the account from John
Locke, who “discreetly [wove] strands of [Hobbes’s] philosophy into . . .
less noxious fabrics of thought.”133 How did Locke tame Hobbes for polite
company? Today’s commentators rarely understand that it was Hobbes’s
egalitarianism (and likely atheism) that made him the Monster of
Malmesbury, not Leviathan’s then-unremarkable endorsement of an
absolute sovereign.134 Consequently, they tend to see the difference between
Hobbes and Locke as lying in Locke’s supposedly more genteel state of
nature and his endorsement of limited rather than absolute government.135 A
better explanation of Locke’s amendments to Hobbesian theory takes notice
of the fact that seventeenth-century Englishmen, and eighteenth-century
128

Id. at 93.
Id. at 93.
130 See id. at 93–94.
131 Thus, for Hobbes, rights do not imply correlative duties. For more on Hobbes’s right to resist
punishment, including a discussion of Hobbes’s conception of rights, see Ristroph, Respect and
Resistance, supra note 121, at 615–18.
132 John Bramhall, The Catching of Leviathan, or the Great Whale, in LEVIATHAN: CONTEMPORARY
RESPONSES TO THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THOMAS HOBBES 115, 145 (G.A.J. Rogers ed., 1995) (“Why
should we not change the name of Leviathan into the Rebells catechism?”); ABRAHAM COWLEY, THE
TRUE EFFIGIES OF THE MONSTER OF MALMESBURY, OR, THOMAS HOBBES IN HIS PROPER COLOURS
(London 1680) (“But his Leviathan, and other Books of his are so full of Madness and Folly, that ’tis
impossible they should be so Taking as they are . . . .”).
133 McDowell, supra note 122, at 424.
134 See COWLEY, supra note 132.
135 Ryan Patrick Alford, Is an Inviolable Constitution a Suicide Pact? Historical Perspective on
Executive Power to Protect the Salus Populi, 58 ST. LOUIS L.J. 355, 363–64 (2014) (characterizing
Hobbes as a theorist of “undivided and unlimited sovereignty” and contrasting his work to the
“constitutionalist” theories of Locke and others).
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American colonists, were in no way ready to embrace a comprehensive
vision of natural human equality. These men were writing a Declaration of
Rights with explicit religious preferences or writing a Constitution to
accommodate slavery.136 For themselves, they may have liked the idea of a
social contract and government by consent, but they were not prepared to
recognize in every human equal political standing.
Locke tamed Hobbes by embracing the language of equality even as he
naturalized inequality. He characterized the state of nature as a “state of
perfect equality,”137 but it is worth looking closely at the basis for equality in
Locke’s state of nature. “Creatures of the same species and rank . . .
should . . . be equal,”138 but are all humans in that category? It rapidly
becomes clear that in Locke’s state of nature, there are “offenders” who need
to be punished, and natural equality becomes, in fact, a right to punish
enjoyed equally among “the innocent” to be exercised against “offenders.”139
Who are the offenders? Locke contemplated a law of nature (“no one ought
to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions”) and assumed that
transgressions of this law would be self-evident—or at any rate, evident to
“the innocent” who would impose punishment.140 Strikingly, Locke’s chapter
on the state of nature is primarily about punishment and inequality, an effort
to explain why “in the state of nature, one man comes by a power over
another.”141
It bears emphasis that to naturalize a right to punish is to make
inequality, not equality, the natural condition of humankind. There can be no

136 See supra Section II.B (discussing religious preferences in the English Declaration of Rights);
Paul Finkelman, How the Proslavery Constitution Led to the Civil War, 43 RUTGERS L.J. 405, 407 (2013)
(discussing some of the protections the Constitution of 1787 gave to chattel slavery). Notably, many state
constitutions also protected slavery, including one that Locke helped draft. THE FUNDAMENTAL
CONSTITUTIONS OF CAROLINA, DRAWN UP BY JOHN LOCKE, MARCH 1, 1669, reprinted in 1 THE
COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 187, 204 (W.L. Saunders ed., Raleigh, P.M. Hale 1886). On
Locke’s involvement in the Carolina constitution, his attitudes toward slavery, and the “mutually
constitutive relationship between liberalism and colonialism,” see David Armitage, John Locke,
Carolina, and the Two Treatises of Government, 32 POL. THEORY 602, 602 (2004).
137 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 272 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1988) (1689) (different typeface and capitalization than original).
138 Id. at 269.
139 See id. at 271–72.
140 See id. at 271 (different capitalization than original).
141 See id. at 272 (different typeface and capitalization than original). Locke was fairly explicit in
acknowledging that he placed a right to punish in the state of nature because he saw no other way to
rationalize a sovereign’s power to punish foreign nationals. See id. at 272–73. In addition to classifying
violations of the law of nature as a “crime” in need of punishment, Locke argued that the individual
injured by these violations could seek “reparation” from the offender. Id. at 273. It is only in the context
of that right of reparation that Locke even mentions self-preservation as a natural right in this chapter.
See id.
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right to punish in Hobbes’s state of nature, for who would hold that right if
not everyone equally? Good guys and bad guys are not natural, self-evident
categories for Hobbes; rather, disagreement about what is good, lawful, or
desirable is a fundamental problem faced by mankind. In Hobbes’s state of
nature, without a shared authority to resolve these disagreements, each
person has an equally valid claim to act in reasonable pursuit of his own selfpreservation. In Locke’s state of nature, in contrast, there are good guys and
bad guys, “the innocent” but also “criminals” and “offenders.”142 The good
guys (presumably) have the right to preserve themselves against the
“criminals,” but Locke doesn’t even address self-defense until later; instead,
Locke first grants the good guys the right to punish offenders. By contrast,
Hobbes insists that crime is a category that existed only after the
establishment of a sovereign. Thus, both thinkers contemplate violent
conflict in the state of nature, but only Locke picks sides, granting moral
authority to “punish” to a select set of persons and labeling the rest
“criminals.”
Locke does not mention a right of self-defense until he describes the
state of war, which arises when one man has declared “by word or action,
not a passionate and hasty, but a sedate setled design, upon another mans
life.”143 In such circumstances, “the safety of the innocent is to be preferred,”
and he has the right to destroy any attacker “as beasts of prey.”144 Locke’s
theory of self-defense allows the “innocent” man a right to kill even “a thief,
who has not in the least hurt him, nor declared any design upon his life, any
farther then, by the use of force, so to get him in his power, as to take away
his money.”145 In a distorted echo of Hobbes’s right to resist even noncapital
punishment, Locke argues that “I have no reason to suppose, that he, who
would take away my liberty, would not when he had me in his power, take
away every thing else. And therefore it is lawful for me to treat him, as one
who has put himself into a state of war with me, i.e. kill him if I can . . . .”146
Locke does not contemplate how the thief might respond, but he clearly does
not view the thief as having an equal right to use force in response.
Thus, for Locke, the pre-political world is one in which some, but not
all, individuals have a right to do violence to others. Writing not long after
Hobbes and having studied his work,147 Locke had surely encountered
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Hobbes’s claim that good faith disagreements about what is reasonable—
what property is rightfully mine, what threats are sufficiently dangerous that
I may reasonably respond, what degree of force is reasonable—are
unavoidable problems faced by humans in the absence of political authority.
But Locke seemed to dismiss this claim, assuming that reason would make
itself known and the difference between the innocent and the aggressor
would simply be self-evident. From this assumption arises the premise of
natural inequality that shapes Locke’s account—rights of violence that
belong to some but not to others. In discussing self-defense, Locke writes
that “force, or a declared design of force upon the person of another, where
there is no common superior on Earth to appeal to for relief, is the state of
war: and ’tis the want of such an appeal gives a man the right of war even
against an aggressor, though he be in society and a fellow subject.”148 But
what is punishment, endorsed by Locke with enthusiasm, but “force, or a
declared design of force upon the person of another”?149 Why would the
target of punishment, whether in the state of nature or in civil society, not
have equal claim to kill the “innocent” punisher?
It is not difficult to see whose theory better fits a Second Amendment
for a carceral state: not Hobbes, the atheist, egalitarian Monster of
Malmesbury, but Locke, that pious carceralist. For Hobbes, all lives matter
equally; for Locke, the lives of the “innocent” are to be preferred, while the
lives of “criminals” are as easily ended as those of “beasts of prey.” For
Hobbes, it is important to recognize that all government is artificial, all
sovereignty the product of human agreement, and thus all classifications of
conduct as criminal are the decisions of a recognized political authority.
Hobbes insists that without a sovereign, the category “criminal” does not
exist. Locke, in contrast, uses the language of criminality to sanctify a
selective right to use violence, an inegalitarian world where, by nature, some
individuals have power over others. And it is Locke’s tradition that Heller
endorses.
CONCLUSION
Dick Heller was a policeman, and it would have been strange indeed if
his efforts to secure his own right to bear arms had produced new constraints
on police authority.150 But Heller arrived in an already-carceral state, and it
was decided by the same Court that has helped enable the development of
148
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150 See supra note 84; see also JENNIFER CARLSON, POLICING THE SECOND AMENDMENT: GUNS,
LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND THE POLITICS OF RACE 6 (2020) (examining law enforcement support for gun
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that state.151 This Essay argues that Heller reaffirmed carceral principles
rather than undermined them. Doctrinal tensions between an individual right
to bear arms and broad police authority to disarm may occupy courts for
some time, but courts are likely to resolve these tensions by reaffirming or
even expanding a criminality exception to the Second Amendment. And the
concept of criminality that informs this exception is likely to be as
discretionary, naturalized, and racialized in this context as it is elsewhere in
American law.
More interesting than doctrinal puzzles, in my view, is a cultural
embrace of the contrast between “law-abiding citizen” and “criminal,” a
contrast that is increasingly visible outside the courts. In a number of widely
reported incidents, self-appointed private guardsmen have identified
unarmed men as purported criminals and shot and killed them, later raising
claims of self-defense.152 The racial dimensions are impossible to ignore,
with the shooter usually white and the victim usually Black. But I think we
need to give still more attention to the carceral logic of these encounters: the
men who bear arms (and use them) in these situations communicate a view
of society divided into law-abiding citizens and criminals. Not merely (or
even) a regrettable inconvenience, the presence of criminals and the need to
subdue them is constitutive of a carceral society. To bear arms and to use
them is what it means to be American on this view. Actual positive laws are
secondary to this logic, as evidenced on January 6, 2021, when protesters—
mostly white, many armed—broke various criminal statutes and forced their
way inside the U.S. Capitol.153 President Donald Trump was initially
reluctant to condemn this group154: “My people aren’t thugs,” he supposedly
151 The Heller majority did not imagine that police would become any less important in a world with
an individual right to bear arms. Indeed, the majority found that the Second Amendment protected
handguns in particular, noting that a handgun “can be pointed at a burglar with one hand while the other
hand dials the police.” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (2008).
152 See Addie C. Rolnick, Defending White Space, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 1639, 1641–46 (2019)
(detailing many incidents of Black and brown persons being killed by private citizens who claim to have
acted in self-defense); Seth Stoughton, Ahmaud Arbery’s Killing Puts a Spotlight on the Blurred Blue
Line of Citizen’s Arrest Laws, CONVERSATION (May 29, 2020, 8:27 AM), https://theconversation.com/
ahmaud-arberys-killing-puts-a-spotlight-on-the-blurred-blue-line-of-citizens-arrest-laws-139275 [https:
//perma.cc/3QEU-6SAN].
153 See Sam Cabral & Roderick Macleod, Capitol Riots: Five Takeaways from the Arrests, BBC
NEWS (Feb. 8, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-55987603 [https://perma.cc/9GZ33P8B] (reporting that the rioters were predominantly white); Tom Dreisbach & Tim Mak, Yes, Capitol
Rioters Were Armed. Here Are the Weapons Prosecutors Say They Used, NPR (Mar. 19, 2021, 5:06 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2021/03/19/977879589/yes-capitol-rioters-were-armed-here-are-the-weaponsprosecutors-say-they-used [https://perma.cc/2JCW-UU32] (reporting that several rioters were armed).
154 See Peter Baker & Maggie Haberman, Capitol Attack Leads Democrats to Demand that Trump
Leave Office, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2021, 2:34 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/07/us/politics/
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said.155 The participants identified themselves as “law-abiding” citizens, and
one explained afterward that though he took an envelope from Speaker of
the U.S. House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi’s office, he left a quarter
behind as payment, proclaiming, “I’m not a thief.”156
In the ongoing prosecutions of those who participated in the January 6
raid on the Capitol, we see an effort to reclaim the authority of positive law
over these naturalistic ideas. But real progress toward racial equality will
likely require a much broader and deeper effort to expose and then reject the
naturalized conception of criminality that underpins so much of American
constitutional doctrine, including the new jurisprudence of the Second
Amendment.

trump-leave-office-resignation.html [https://perma.cc/ZT5J-XEEK] (reporting that President Trump did
not condemn the Capitol rioters until he became aware that he could face criminal liability for inciting a
riot).
155 Ashley Collman, Official Describes President as “Total Monster” Who Refused to Act as
Congress Was Stormed, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 7, 2021, 4:20 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/trumptotal-monster-during-capitol-siege-aides-say-report-2021-1 [https://perma.cc/BC4Q-LDBL].
156 Jon Swaine, Man Who Posed at Pelosi Desk Said in Facebook Post That He Is Prepared for
Violent Death, WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2021, 7:42 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/
man-who-posed-at-pelosi-desk-said-in-facebook-post-that-he-is-prepared-for-violent-death/2021/01/07/
cf5b0714-509a-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html [https://perma.cc/8T8Z-6G5Y]; Sergio Olmos &
Conrad Wilson, At Least 3 Men from Oregon Protest Appear to Have Joined Insurrection at U.S. Capitol,
OPB (Jan. 10 2021, 1:31 PM), https://www.opb.org/article/2021/01/10/oregon-washington-protestinsurrection-david-anthony-medina-tim-davis/ [https://perma.cc/9UEJ-U2DJ] (“law abiding citizen”);
see also Emily Birnbaum, Trump Told Facebook’s Oversight Board that His Supporters Were ‘Law
Abiding’ During Capitol Riot, YAHOO! FIN. (May 5, 2021, 7:08 AM), https://finance.yahoo.com/
finance/news/trump-told-facebooks-oversight-board-120833307.html [https://perma.cc/5EKK-QQD2]
(noting Trump characterized his supporters at the January 6 riot as “law-abiding”).
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